I. INTRODUCTION
R ADIO Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a wireless identification method that uses radio frequency to send and receive data. Most of the RFID systems comprise of three components: tags, reader(s) and a back-end database. On the other hand, a passive tag is a highly constrained microchip with an antenna that stores an unique tag identifier and other linked information about the labelled item. To provide an adequate security level for such constrained devices, in the last years several ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols have been proposed, e.g., [3] , [4] , but all these schemes have flaws and vulnerabilities to a greater or lesser degree [2] .
Regarding standardization, several standards have been adopted for diverse applications in different countries and unlikely there is no an universal standard. In UHF band, EPC Class-1 Generation-2 or equivalently ISO/IEC 18006 is one of the most widely standards [5] . In fact, ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) have contributed into the development of several international standards for internationally use-able frequencies for RFID systems. In this vain, ISO/IEC WD 29167-6 [7] has been recently proposed to strengthen the security of ISO/IEC 18000-6 standard. More precisely Part 6 (also known as 18000-6) defines parameters for air interface communications between 860 and 960 MHz to identify and manage items [6] . This standard describes three security protocols, denoted by Protocol 1, 2 and 3 respectively. On the other hand, Song et al. recently analyzed the security of Protocol 1 and showed that the proposed scheme is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [8] . In addition, the authors proposed an improved version of protocol, named Protocol 1+, to overcome this security fault, while maintaining similar performance. Nevertheless, we show that they failed in their attempt and the improved protocol can also suffer a MITM attack. The success probability of the proposed attack is 1 while the attack complexity is just one execution of the protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Step (0) to (10) of Protocol 1+ [8] are exactly the same as step (0) to (10) of Protocol 1 of ISO/IEC WD 29167-6 [7] . To facilitate reader understanding, all the steps of Protocol 1+ are described below, where we denote a tag and a reader by T and R respectively. In addition, E k (m) symbolizes the encryption of a message m with the key k. The encryption process is an exclusive-OR (XOR) operation between a plaintext and a key-stream of the same bit-length. 0) R sends the Select command to tags, to select a particular population of tags, based on the user-defined criteria. 1) R initiates an inventory round by sending a Query command and decides which tags participate in the round among the tag population.
2) The selected tag T sends a 16-bit random number RN D16 to R. 3) When R receives RN D16, it replies an ACK command containing the same RN D16. 4) Once T receives this message, it sends its protocol control (P C), extended protocol control (XP C) and void or random unique item identifier (U II), where P C contains physical-layer information in 16 bits, XP C indicates additional tag functions in 16 (or 32) bits, and U II is a code that identifies the tag holder. 5) R sends Get Capabilities(RN D16) to get T 's capabilities. 6) In response to the command, T sends Capabilities, CryptoF unc and RN D16. Capabilities indicates the support of crypto engine and file management services in 16 bits, and CryptoF unc indicates in 16 bits the cryptographic suite and security functions that T supports.
7) R then replies Sec Init(RnInt, RN D16), where
RnInt is a 64-bit random number generated by R.
8) Upon its reception, T sends its security parameter (SecP aram), key index (KI), RnT ag and RN D16.
RnT ag is a 64-bit random number generated by T . SecP aram indicates the support of the security mode and the master key of T and the word-length L of KI, in 16 bits. KI indicates in (L × 16) bits the location of the master key in a database of the key pool that R stores. T then runs AES Engine, inputting (RnInt, RnT ag) and keying the master key, and outputs a session key k of 128 bits. 9) When R receives T 's response, it replies the second ACK(RN D16). R also runs AES engine, inputting (RnInt, RnT ag) and keying the master key to generate a session key. 10) T encrypts a sequence of P C, XP C and U II with key k and sends it to R. The message is equal to (
, where k i is the i-th block of key k and has the same bit-length as the message with which it is XORed. 11) R decrypts P C, XP C and U II from the received mes-
where Len is a 3-bit indicator of the word-length of ChInt (one word is 16 bits), ChInt is a random number generated by R, and RN D16 is a 16-bit random number generated in step (2) . The message is equal to
, where k i is the i-th block of the session key k and each of k i has the same bit length as the message which it is XORed, excluding k 5 for which the bit-length is log 2 (Len × 16). It should be noted that x << y (resp. x >> y) means rotating all bits of x to the left (resp. right) by y bits. 12) T decrypts the message sent by R, and verifies whether the decrypted RN D16 is correct. If so, T authenticates R and replies
where ChT ag is a random number generated by T in the same bit-length as ChInt, and the length of k 8 is log 2 (Len × 16) bits. The message is equal to
where both k 9 and k 10 have the same bit-length as ChInt. 13) R decrypts the message sent by T , and checks whether the decrypted ChInt and ChT ag are correct. If they are correct, R authenticates T and also ensures that T has the same value of Handle = L 8 (ChInt) L 8 (ChT ag), which will be used as a secret parameter in the following access operation.
Step (11) to (13) of the original Protocol 1 in ISO/IEC WD 29167-6 [7] are as follows: 11) R decrypts P C, XP C and U II from the message backscattered by T . R then sends Sec ReqRN (E k (Len, ChInt, RN D16)), where Len is a 3-bit indicator of the length of ChInt in word size and ChInt is a random number generated by R. 12) T decrypts the message sent by R, and checks whether the decrypted RN D16 is equal to the initial RN D16. If so, T authenticates R and replies E k (ChInt, Handle), where Handle is a 16-bit random number generated by T used as a token in the following access operation. 13) R decrypts the message sent by T , and checks whether the decrypted ChInt is correct. If the check is valid, R authenticates T . Mutual authentication is completed and the channel is continuing. R will access T by sending access commands (e.g., Read, W rite, Kill and Lock)
including Handle as a parameter under encryption. If the decrypted Handle is different from the original one, the channel is terminated.
It can be seen that Protocol 1+ has three main differences in comparison to Protocol 1. The differences are outlined below:
1) The encrypted tokens in step (11) and (12) of Protocol 1+ are a bit more complex than in Protocol 1. More precisely, Protocol 1 only uses XOR operation (apart of the encryption engine) to generate the exchanged messages, while Protocol 1+ employs XOR and rotation operations.
to the tag and T only verifies the correctness of the recovered RN D16 . If it passes the verification, then T accepts the recovered ChInt without any checking but this value could have been altered by the adversary during its transmission through the insecure radio channel. Similarly, when the tag sends
to the reader, R only verifies the correctness of the recovered ChInt . If it passes the verification, then T accepts the recovered Handle without any checking again. Song et al. revised these messages in Protocol 1+ such that the different message blocks sent by R (resp. by T ) are correlated and also encrypted by k i . 3) In Protocol 1 the value of Handel is only generated by the tag while in Protocol 1+ this value is composed with random numbers ChInt and ChT ag generated by R and T respectively.
In [8] Song et al. claim that these differences are enough to make the protocol secure against MITM attacks. Nevertheless in the next section we show how an attacker still can run a successful MITM attack against Protocol 1+.
III. MITM ATTACK ON PROTOCOL 1+
An adversary A is able to force R and T on sharing a different Handle after a successful authentication. In particular, A does as follows: 0-10) When a session of Protocol 1+ is executed, A eavesdrops the communications between R and T up to step (10).
to the tag, A intercepts this message and replaces it by
Len is a Len-word of all-ones (one word is 16 bits). 12) T decrypts the message sent by R, and verifies whether the decrypted RN D16 is correct. If the check is valid (which is the case here because A has not modified that fraction of the message originally sent by the reader and she preserves the correlation between the parts), T authenticates R and replies ((ChT ag << k 8 
A intercepts the message and replaces it by ((ChT ag << k 8 ChT ag) ⊕ k 10 ) ). 13) R decrypts the message sent by T , and checks whether the decrypted ChInt and ChT ag are correct. If so, (which it is because the reader receives an unaltered message), R authenticates T and also ensures that T has the same value of Handle = L 8 (ChInt) L 8 (ChT ag), which will be used as a secret parameter in the following access operation. Following the given attack, the reader generates Handle = L 8 (ChInt) L 8 (ChT ag) as a token for the following access operation, while the tag expects Handle = (
As result, T will never accept the following access commands (e.g, Read and Lock) sent by R for the entire duration of a tag access operation. Note that the success probability of the attack is 1 and only requires the execution of one protocol session.
The proposed attack is based on Theorem described below: Theorem 1: Let A and B be L bit-strings. Then, ∀ n ∈ Z+, (A ⊕ B) satisfies the following properties:
Proof: Let X i the i-th bit of a L-bit string. Then ∀j and being C = (A ⊕ B) << n: 
because B << n = B.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE In the RFID context, there is a research area called ultralightweight cryptography. This sort of protocols are based on the use of simple and hardware efficient operations. In particular, bitwise operations (e.g., AND and XOR operations) and modular operations (e.g., additions) are commonly used. All these operations are Triangular functions (T-functions in short), which means that the i-th bit of output depends on i = 0, 1, · · · , i bits of input word and it does not depend on the more significant input bits. Exploiting this weak property, ultra-lightweight protocols are broken to a greater or lesser degree [2] . On the other hand, the use of non-triangular operations -mainly rotations-difficult the protocol analysis but it does not guarantee its security [1] . In fact, in our proposed attack an adversary exploits the non-resistance of XOR operation against active attackers and the weak property of rotation operation against ones-word (X << N = X, when X = 0xF F..F and ∀ n ∈ Z+).
Apart of this, the weak point in Protocol 1+ (and Protocol 1) resides on the selected operation mode for the block cipher.
The chosen mechanism is Output Feedback (OFB) mode. In this operation mode, the session key is computed taking the previous session key as input and the master key as a key. Besides an encrypted block is obtained by computing the XOR between the session key and the block message (i.e., c j = m i ⊕ k i ). This encrypted message is sent over the insecure radio channel and an active attacker can alter it as shown in Section III.
As just mentioned the use of lightweight operators is not a strong mechanism to strengthen the security of a protocol. On the other hand, tags conforming ISO/IEC WD 29167-6 support on-board an AES cipher. Instead of using OFB mode, we recommend the use of Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode with a secret IV -secret IV is a method for protecting the integrity of IV . Using this mode, the adversary does not have any control to manipulate the output of the cipher (i.e. c j = E key (m j ⊕ c j−1 )).
V. CONCLUSION
ISO/IEC WD 29167-6 standard was proposed aiming to improve the security of ISO/IEC 18006. Unfortunately, Protocol 1 suffers from MITM attacks. Song et al. proposed an improved schemed, called Protocol 1+. As shown in this letter, the new protocol is as insecure as its predecessors. An attacker can exploit the weak properties of T-functions and the non-resistance of the radio channel against active attack (i.e., bit manipulation). To overcome this weaknesses and taking advantage of having on-chip an AES engine, we propose to exchange OFB mode for CBC mode avoiding non-standard approaches.
